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DICKINSON LAWF REVIEW

THE INHERENT SAFETY IN CALLING A CONVENTION FOR THE
PURPOSE OF PROPOSING AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
By
FRANK

E.

PACKARD*

Under the provisions of Article V of th-e Constitution of the United States
amendments may be proposed in either one of two modes: by passage by two-thirds
of those present' in each of both houses of the Congress, a quorum being present
in each house, or by passage by a convention called by the Congress in response
to resolutions adopted by two-thirds (or thirty-two) of the several State legislatures memorializing the Congress to call such a convention. A convention may
merely propose. It not only has no power to ratify, but also has no power to provide which of the two modes of ratification (by State legislatures or by State conventions) shall be used. The latter power is lodged in the Congress. It is thc singular
purpose of this paper to prove conclusively and for all time that the calling of such
a convention is not analogous to the opening of a Pandora's box.
The calling of a convention for the purpose of proposing amendments to the
Constitution is, according to Professor Hugh Evander Willis, 2 by a simple majority
of the Congress and is also without the necessity of obtaining the approval of the
President. The question arises as to whether the method of selecting delegates to
the convention would be determined by the Congress or by the States and whether
the convention would vote by population ratios or by States. Professor Lester Bernhardt Orfield declares that: "If the precedent of the Constitutional Convention
were followed, the call would be addressed to the states, and would leave to them
the method of selecting delegates; and the convention would vote by states." 4 Mr.
Wayne B. Wheeler states that: "In the Convention of 1787 that framed the present
Constitution the delegates were elected by states and voted by states. This precedent
would probably be followed in a future constitutional convention if one should be
held. As a matter of political expediency, a convention call would probably be
5
addressed to the states and leave to them the method of selecting delegates.'"
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Another problem which confronts us is whether a convention called by the
Congress under the terms of Article V could undertake to promulgate an entirely
new Constitution for the United States. Professor Orfield declares that: "Perhaps
the most important question concerning a convention is as to the extent of its
powers. Could it propose a wholly new constitution? Article V says that Congress
'shall call a convention for proposing amendments.' If this rule were interpreted
literally, it might be argued that the convention could not propose an entirely
new constitution in the form of a single document superseding the existing Constitution." 6 Mr. William A. Platz states that: "But if the convention were to have
such power (to propose a new Constitution), would not Article V so state, without
7
leaving the matter to inference?"
Still another question which manifests itself is whether a convention whicn
goes beyond the scope of its powers, as, for example, attempting to usurp legislative functions, can be restrained by legal process. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania declared in 1874 in Wells v. Bain that: "The convention is not a co-ordinate
branch of the government. It exercises no governmental power, but is a body
raised by law, in aid of the popular desire to discuss and propose amendments,
which have no governing force so long as they remain propositions. While it acts
within the scope of its delegated powers, it is not amenable for its acts, but
when it assumes to delegate, to repeal and displace existing institutions before
they are displaced by the adoption of its propositions, it acts without authority,
and the citizens injured thereby are entitled, und'er the declaration of rights, to an
OPEN Court to redress at our hands. " The Supreme Court of Michigan stated in
1908 in Carton v. Secretary of State that: "Should the convention attempt to exercise authority not conferred upon it, its action can be restrained the same as can any
other body acting illegally.''

9

"A convention has no inherent rights, in the words of the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania. Therefore, the inherent safety in a convention! The fact that the
authority of delegates to a convention is not set forth in Article V is no cause for
alarm. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire declared in 1889 in Opinion of the
justices that: "*** the authority of the delegates is not set forth. They are not

endowed with the entire sovereignty of the state. Their agency, like every branch
of the public service, is not marked on all sides by fixed bounds.'"'
Yet another problem, one of especial significance, which poses itself is whether
the. subject matter contained in the memorialization resolution represents to a
convention only the power of suggestion or whether such subject matter constitutes
6 Orfield, Professor Lester Bernhardt, Tim AMENDING OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, Callaghan
and Co., Chicago, 1942, p. 44.
7 Platz, William A., ARTICLE FIVE OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, 3 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 17, 46
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8 Wells v. Bain, 75 Pa. 39, 57 (1874).
9 Carton v. Secretary of State, 151 Mich. 337, 346, 347, 115 N.W. 429, 432, 433 (1908).
10 Wood's Appeal, 75 Pa. 59, 69, 73 (1874).
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CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS BY CONVENTION

the only topics for proposed amendments which the convention may consider and
act upon by adopting or rejecting. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
declared in 1833 in Opinion of the Justices that: "If, however, the people should
by the terms of their vote, decide to call a convention of delegates to consider the
expediency of altering the constitution in some particular part thereof, we are of
opinion that such delegates would derive their whole authority and commission
from such vote; and, upon the general principles governing the delegation of
power and authority, they would have no right, under such vote, to act upon and
12
propose amendments in other parts of the constitution not so specified."
The Court of Appeals of South Carolina (now the Supreme Court of South
Carolina) stated in 1834 in The State ex rel. M'Creadyv. Hunt that: "If **** the
people, electing delegates in their primary capacity, had, by a majority of their
ballots, specified a particular measure to be considered and dtcided in the convention, will it be pretended that the convention would have possessed authority for
any other purpose?"'$
The authorities are in agreement and support the foregoing judicial opinions
to the effect that the subject matter contained in the memorialization resolutions
constitutes the only topics for proposed amendments which the convention take
under consideration and act upon .accordingly. Professor Thomas M. Cooley declares that: "The constitutional convention is the representative of sovereignty
only in a very qualified sense, and for the specific purpose, and with the restricted
authority to put in proper form the questions of amendment upon which the people
are to pass." 14
Professor Henry Campbell Black states that: "A constitutional convention
has no authority to enact legislation of a general sort, and if the convention is called
for the purpose of amending the Constitution in a specified part, the delegates
have no power to act upon and propose amendments in other parts of the Constitution."1 5
Historically, the only subject matter ever contained in State resolutions memorializing the Congress to call a convention consists of the following topics for
proposed amendments:
1. Against protective tariff
2. Direct election of Senators
3. Prohibition of polygamy
12 Opinion of the Justices, 60 Mass. 573, 575 (1833).

18 The State ex te1. M'Cready v. Hunt, Court of Appeals of South Carolina, 2 S. C. L. 291, 538
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Publishing Co., St. Paul, 1927, p. 45.
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4. Direct cl-ection of President, Vice President and Senators
5. Control of trusts
6. Constitutionality of State enactment
7. Imposition of twenty-five per cent limitation on income, gift and estate
taxes
8. World federal government.
Number 2 and one-third of number 4 of the foregoing as outstanding subject
matter for the consideration of a convention called by the Congress would seem
to have been cancelled out by the adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment. The
continuation of number 1 as subject matter for the consideration of a convention
seems largely to have been negated by the establishment and pursuance of a policy
of reciprocal trade treaties between the United States and the several Pan American
republics. Likewise, the pendency of number 3 as subject matter for a convention's
consideration seems for the most part to have been avoided by the institution
and pursuance of a policy of discountenance of polygamy by the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints. Also the preservation of number 5 as subject matter
17
was impaired by the passage of the Sherman 16 and Clayton Anti-Trust Acts.
Thus, the foregoing process of elimination would leave only two-thirds of number
4 and numbers 6, 7 and 8 as legitimate and prevailing subject matter today for
the consideration of a convention called by the Congress for the purpose of pro.
posing amendments to the Constitution of the United States.
16 July 2, 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209.
17 Oct. 15, 1914 ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730.

